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Disruptive Disobedience
Derek Edyvane, University of Leeds
Enes Kulenovic, University of ZagrebThis article addresses a neglected class of cases of civic resistance involving the anonymous and covert disruption of
institutions and practices. Such cases have become more commonplace in the ﬁrst decades of the twenty-ﬁrst century
with the rise of “hacktivism,” but they sit uneasily within the traditional conceptual and normative framework of civil
disobedience the legitimacy of which is premised on the publicity of dissent and on the willingness of dissenters to
accept the legal consequences of their actions. To make sense of these new forms of civic resistance, the article
introduces the concept of “disruptive disobedience.” It elaborates the concept by contrasting it with other forms of civic
resistance, and proposes a moral justiﬁcation for it by presenting it as a corrective to democratic exclusion. Finally, it
tests that justiﬁcation by applying it to a prominent contemporary case involving Aaron Swartz’s illegal download of
JSTOR research articles.On January 6, 2011, Massachusetts Institute of Tech-nology campus police, with the assistance of a USSecret Service agent, arrested Aaron Swartz on two
counts of breaking and entering with the intent to commit a
felony. Swartz, a fellow at Harvard University and a well-
known Internet activist, used his access to JSTOR, a digital
library of academic journals, to illegally download over
4.8 million research articles. He concealed a small laptop
connected to an external hard drive in the wiring closet in the
basement of Building 16 at MIT, allowing him to download
the articles with approximate worth of $50,000. Unbeknown
to Swartz, and on the advice of the Secret Service agent, MIT
security had installed a surveillance camera in the closet that
enabled the identiﬁcation of Swartz when he returned for the
laptop and, subsequently, this led to his arrest. Federal pros-
ecutions charged Swartz with wire fraud and 11 violations of
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, a charge carrying a
maximum ﬁne of $1 million and 35 years in prison (Cohen
2013).
The story ended tragically when, in January 2013, a few
days after the offer of a plea bargain was refused by the pros-
ecution, Swartz committed suicide. Even after his death, the
question remains as to whether his illegal procurement of elec-
tronic data from JSTORwasmere theft ormorally justiﬁed civic
resistance. There is no doubt that Swartz was practicing what he
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All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms cess Manifesto,” in which he calls upon those with access to
research articles and data protected by pay-walls—“students,
librarians, scientists”—to trade passwords and ﬁll download
requests for friends, and he invites hackers to “sneak through
halls” and climb “over fences” to liberate “the information
locked up by the publishers.” “The world’s entire scientiﬁc
and cultural heritage,” warns Swartz, is “being digitalized
and locked up by a handful of private corporations,” limiting
access to those—like elite universities—willing to pay “enor-
mous amounts” for it. He asserts that there is no justice in
following unjust laws and that “in the grand tradition of civil
disobedience,” we should “declare our opposition to this pri-
vate theft of public culture” (Swartz 2008).
Swartz was not alone in viewing the illegal hacking and
sharing of access to protected scientiﬁc databases as acts of
civil disobedience. In an article published in the New York
Times, philosopher Peter Ludlow concludes that “Swartz
engaged in the act of civil disobedience to liberate that
knowledge” that should be available to everyone and not
just the chosen few (Ludlow 2013). The language of civil
disobedience was also used by the so-called Anonymous 16,
a hacking group that used a DDoS cyber-attack (crashing
websites by ﬂooding them with data) on PayPal after it was
revealed that PayPal, Amazon, Visa, and Mastercard had
refused service to WikiLeaks after its release of thousands
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instead of using physical bodies to obstruct business, com-
puter data were used to block web sites. Following the ar-
rest of a few of the hackers from the Anonymous group,
Sabu, one of the leading members, claimed: “The problem
is not the hackers. It’s the thinking of our governments.
They need to show their citizens that the government can
retaliate against civil disobedience” (in Olson 2013, 363).1
However, the actions of Swartz and Anonymous 16 sit
uneasily within the conceptual framework of civil disobe-
dience. We tend to think of civil disobedience as “an illegal,
public, nonviolent, conscientiously motivated act of protest,
done by someone who accepts the legitimacy of the legal
and political systems and who submits to arrest and pun-
ishment” (Harris 1989, 2). Two essential elements of civil
disobedience—its public character and the willingness of
those involved to be arrested and prosecuted—are both
absent from the law-breaking Swartz advocated. He never
intended to get caught, and, when apprehended by MIT se-
curity, he tried to escape. Likewise, the members of Anony-
mous 16 went to considerable lengths to conceal their identi-
ties and evade capture.2
The problem, of course, is not that Swartz, Ludlow, and
Sabu were failing to use the concept of civil disobedience
with the precision expected of analytical philosophers. Part
of the reason we think of civil disobedience as a morally jus-
tiﬁed act of law-breaking is just because it is public and those
involved in such acts are ready to suffer the legal consequences.
Even if we extend our understanding of civil disobedience to
include anonymous and secretive law-breaking of the sort for
which Swartz and Anonymous 16 were prosecuted, we cannot
defend their actions by relying on the arguments that are
employed in the justiﬁcation of civil disobedience. That
defense would need to provide a compelling justiﬁcation for
anonymous and secretive resistance in the context of a dem-
ocratic society.
Apart from civil disobedience, there are other forms of
morally justiﬁable civic resistance that involve law-breaking.
Some of these forms involve public acts of resistance (e.g.,
conscientious objection or testing the law), and some do not
(such as whistle-blowing). But none adequately captures the
mode of resistance in which Swartz and Anonymous sought1. Sabu (whose real name is Hector Monsegur) later became an FBI in-
formant and helped the government to arrest several prominent hacktivists.
See also the documentary by Brian Knappenberger, We Are Legion (Knap-
penberger 2012).
2. There is a difference worth noting between the Anonymous 16
DDoS attack and Swartz’s JSTOR hack: although both were committed
anonymously, the DDoS attack was a public act of law-breaking, while the
JSTOR download was performed in secret.
This content downloaded from 129.011.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms to engage. To do so, we argue that it is necessary to move
beyond the existing typology and introduce a new concept
that we term disruptive disobedience. This article is divided
into three sections. First, we introduce the idea of disruptive
disobedience by contrasting it with other forms of civic re-
sistance, including civil disobedience, conscientious objec-
tion, whistle-blowing, and democratic disobedience. The aim
of this section is to examine why publicity, nonanonymity,
and legal responsibility for breaking the law are considered
necessary conditions of morally justiﬁed disobedience in dem-
ocratic societies. Second, we offer a normative account of dis-
ruptive disobedience as a morally and democratically justiﬁed
mode of civic resistance. It is our contention that disruptive
disobedience is justiﬁed where it functions to disrupt exclu-
sionary practices that contribute to the incapacitation of cit-
izenship. Finally, we return to the case of Aaron Swartz to
consider how far his conduct may be interpreted as justiﬁed
disruptive disobedience.
RETHINKING CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
This article challenges the suppositions that legitimate civic
resistance must be nonanonymous and public and that those
involved must be ready to accept the legal consequences of
their actions. In this section, we survey the tradition of thought
about civil disobedience in order to explain the sources of those
suppositions. To do so, it is helpful ﬁrst to reﬂect on the pur-
pose, or telos, of civil disobedience. A seminal text here is John
Rawls’s essay on “The Justiﬁcation of Civil Disobedience.” On
Rawls’s account, the purpose of civil disobedience is to appeal
to themajority’s sense of justice: “Civil disobedience, when it is
justiﬁed, is normally to be understood as a political action
which addresses the sense of justice of the majority in order to
urge the reconsideration of themeasures protested and towarn
that in the ﬁrm opinion of the dissenters the conditions of
social cooperation are not being honored” (Rawls 1999a, 176).
Later, in A Theory of Justice, Rawls deﬁnes civil disobedience
as “a way of addressing the sense of justice of the commu-
nity, an invocation of the recognized principles of cooperation
among equals” (Rawls 1971, 385).
This deﬁnition suggests two important distinctions. First,
civil disobedience, understood as an appeal to the sense of
justice of the political community, differs from other forms
of political resistance such as testing the law or conscientious
objection. Testing the law is a call for judicial review, and
therefore the dissenter will respect whatever decision is made
by the highest authority in the legal system. The aim of civil
disobedience, by contrast, is not to question the law’s validity
but to question its justness. This means that the consistent
dissenter will continue to disobey the law even if it is pro-
claimed to be constitutional by the court. As Rawls argued,023.117 on September 07, 2017 01:34:23 AM
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4. The dichotomy between reformers’ and revolutionaries’ use of
disobedience is inevitably simpliﬁed. It does not take into account those
Volume 79 Number 4 October 2017 / 000civil disobedience “is indeed thought to be contrary to law, at
least in the sense that those engaged in it are not simply
presenting a test case for a constitutional decision; they are
prepared to oppose the statute even if it should be upheld”
(Rawls 1971, 365). The distinction between conscientious
objection and civil disobedience resides in what motivates
the dissenter to disobey: the conscientious objector aims to
avoid doing something he or she deems to be morally wrong,
while the civil disobedient aims to rectify the perceived in-
justice by educating the public. As Hugo Bedau writes,
“When the conscientious objector violates the law, he or she
does so primarily in order to avoid conduct condemned by
personal conscience even though required by public law. . . .
The primary purpose of conscientious objection is not public
education but private exemption, not political change but
(to put it bluntly) personal hand-washing” (Bedau 1991, 7).
This ﬁrst distinction—between the purpose of civil dis-
obedience and the purposes of other forms of civic resis-
tance—helps us to understand why the public character of
disobedience is an essential part of its moral justiﬁcation.
The reason the law is broken is to raise the awareness of
the democratic public about the unjust nature of a speciﬁc
law or policy. Breaking the law in secrecy would defeat the
purpose. Civil disobedience, therefore, can be compared “to
public speech, and being a form of address, an expression
of profound and conscientious political conviction, it takes
place in the public forum” (Rawls 1971, 366). This tells us
why publicity is a necessary requirement of civil disobedi-
ence, but it does not explain why nonanonymity and will-
ingness to bear the legal consequences of breaking the law
are also required. One could try to address “the sense of
justice of the majority” by breaking the law publicly while
hiding one’s identity or avoiding arrest.3 To answer this ques-
tion, we must turn to the second distinction.
The second distinction is that between the logic of the
acts of civil disobedience in liberal-democratic contexts and
the logic of such acts in the context of authoritarian or au-
tocratic regimes. In the former context, we presuppose that
the government in power (both its legislative and executive
branches) has legitimacy to pass and enforce the laws. The
act of civil disobedience does not question the legitimacy of
the government but that of a speciﬁc law or policy. When
faced with an undemocratic, authoritarian, or tyrannical gov-3. The hacktivism of the group Anonymous seems to fall into this
category: acts of law-breaking that are public but where those responsible
seek to avoid punishment by concealing their identities. There are also
cases where the opposite is true: Brian Smart discusses cases such as
activists releasing lab animals from captivity or vandalizing military in-
frastructure, which can only be done in secret, but who later publicly
acknowledge their involvement (Smart 1991).
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but the legitimacy of the government itself. The core of liberal
thought is that a government that continually violates the basic
rights of its citizens, or that comes to and remains in power not
through general consent but through force, loses its legitimacy,
and therefore its subjects have a moral right to rebel against it.
Faced with an undemocratic and authoritarian regime, one
uses disobedience not only as a form of resistance to unjust
laws but also as a form of resistance to illegitimate government.
In this context, civil disobedience has the same goal as violent
revolution—to overthrow the government. The difference be-
tween the two modes of resistance resides in the choice of
tactics. There are several reasons to favor the path of peaceful
disobedience. Nonviolent and public resistance is often a more
effective way of eliciting sympathy and support for a cause,
both at home and abroad. Itmay also be the case that the police
and military forces ranged against the dissenters are simply so
overwhelmingly strong as to render violent resistance futile.
Alternatively, there may be principled reasons to adopt a
nonviolent approach, bound up with particular moral, reli-
gious, or political doctrines. In the history of the twentieth
century, both political prudence and paciﬁst ideals have played
a role in different resistance movements choosing nonviolent
disobedience over violent revolution, guerrilla warfare, or un-
derground armed resistance.
This second distinction, between disobedience in dem-
ocratic versus undemocratic contexts,4 is essential for un-
derstanding why “arrest and punishment,” as Rawls puts it,
“are expected and accepted without resistance” as a neces-
sary condition of the legitimacy of civil disobedience (Rawls
1999a, 182). By publicly breaking the law and later accepting
the legal consequences of that action, we acknowledge the le-
gitimacy of the government. “The law is broken,” Rawls ar-
gued, “but ﬁdelity to law is expressed by the public and non-
violent nature of the act, by the willingness to accept the legal
consequences of one’s conduct” (Rawls 1971, 367). This line
of argument echoes Martin Luther King’s Letter from Bir-
mingham Jail: “I submit that an individual who breaks a law
that conscience tells him is unjust, and willingly accepts the
penalty by staying in jail to arouse the conscience of the com-cases of “uncivil disobedience” that Jennet Kirkpatrick discusses in her
study of violent political protests and movements in US history (militant
abolitionists, the Weather Underground, violent labor groups, lynch mobs
in the post-Reconstruction South, the temperance movement, or con-
temporary right-wing militias). Although violent, these movements were
more reformist than revolutionary in their character through their appeal
to “concepts like law, rights, liberty, freedom, and popular sovereignty,”
the moral ideals of the American Revolution and the Constitution
(Kirkpatrick 2008, 19).
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highest respect for law” (King 1991, 74). A citizen of the liberal-
democratic community involved in the act of civil disobedi-
ence is not a revolutionary trying to bring down the system,
but a reformer appealing to “moral principles which deﬁne a
conception of civil society and the public good” (Rawls 1999a,
181) to try to abolish an unjust law or policy. This explains
why such acts should not be conducted secretly and why those
involved should not try to avoid arrest and punishment. In the
words of Michael Walzer, “A man breaks the law, but does so
in ways which do not challenge the legitimacy of legal or po-
litical systems” (Walzer 1970, 24).5
It is worth noting that mainstream liberal thinking about
the telos of civil disobedience did not go unchallenged. One
such challenge came from Peter Singer, who argues that
Rawls’s insistence on a “shared conception of justice” as a
guideline in determining if the law is just means that we can
question a law only in the light of the principles that the
community already accepts. If we conclude that civil dis-
obedience is justiﬁed only when we are faced with an unjust
law, that would mean that whatever falls outside the realm
of this shared conception of justice (e.g., to use Singer’s ex-
ample, the rights of animals) does not furnish a valid reason
to disobey (Singer 1973, 90). Singer’s account of civil dis-
obedience is much broader than Rawls’s in the sense that it
can include an appeal to the existing sense of justice of the
majority but can also go further than that in trying to extend
or transform the majority’s sense of justice. A second note-
worthy challenge came from Daniel Markovits, who argues
that Rawls’s model, by relying on the Civil Rights Movement
as a historical paradigm of civil disobedience, offers too nar-
row an account that fails to provide justiﬁcation for later
cases of disobedience, such as protests against the Vietnam
War, anti-nuclear protests in Western European countries
in the 1980s, or recent anti-globalization protests (Markovits
2005, 1901). To amend this, Markovits introduces the idea of
democratic disobedience, where, by breaking the law, citizens
address deﬁcits in the democratic decision-making process. His5. The use of this normative distinction between acts of peaceful re-
sistance in undemocratic and authoritarian regimes and morally justiﬁable
acts of civil disobedience in speciﬁc historical cases is challenged by David
Lyons, who argues that peaceful law-breaking does not require moral
justiﬁcation in the context of deeply unjust regimes, which, on his his-
torical reading, include not only British colonial rule in India or the pre–
Civil War system of slavery in the American South but also the Jim Crow
laws in the United States until 1964. “Insofar as civil disobedience theory
assumes that political resistance requires moral justiﬁcation even in the
settings that are morally comparable to Jim Crow, it is premised on serious
moral error” (Lyons 1998, 39). For discussion of the historical context—
the Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War—in which Rawls and
Walzer developed their theories of disobedience, see Forrester (2014).
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ﬁrst, in representative democracies, different special interest
groups can have an unwarranted impact on law making or
policy making, which can lead to “manipulation and abuse” of
the democratic process by these “special interests” (Markovits
2005, 1922); second, collective decision making sometimes
leads to the exclusion of important political issues from the
public discourse, thereby compromising the neutrality of the
democratic process. The purpose of democratic disobedience
is to tackle the negative consequences of these democratic def-
icits and to enhance democracy by going beyond the Rawl-
sian model of civil disobedience that is reserved exclusively
for addressing the violation of common principles of justice
and basic rights (Markovits 2005, 1937). Both Singer’s and
Markovits’s challenges are important innovations in the lib-
eral tradition of thinking about civil disobedience, but nei-
ther puts into question publicity, nonanonymity, and legal
responsibility as core requirements of morally justiﬁed dis-
obedience. Even if we redeﬁne the purpose of civil disobedi-
ence in the way these authors have done, these requirements
remain essential parts of its moral justiﬁcation. There is con-
sequently very limited consideration in the literature as to
whether there can be, from a liberal perspective, any legitimate
acts of civic resistance that are secretive, anonymous, and
evasive of legal consequences.
Rawls himself discusses justiﬁed forms of covert political
resistance: he refers to them as conscientious evasion, and
he offers the example of secretive breaking of fugitive slave
law before the abolition of slavery in the United States
(Rawls 1971, 369). His argument is that covert resistance is
acceptable in cases where punishment or the consequences
of publicly breaking certain laws would be too dire.6 James
Scott’s anthropological research addressing secretive and anon-
ymous resistance in his books Weapons of the Weak (1985)
and Domination and the Arts of Resistance (1990) conﬁrms
this line of thinking. Analyzing what he calls infrapolitics—“a
wide variety of low-proﬁle forms of resistance that dare not
speak in their own name”—Scott concludes that “the fear of
retaliation” is the main reason for covert and/or anonymous
acts of resistance (Scott 1990, 19).7 But both Scott’s descrip-
tive examples of infrapolitics and Rawls’s normative concept
of conscientious evasion involve situations where a dominant
group ensures submission through systematic institutional op-6. Similarly, Peter Singer ﬁnds evasion of legal punishment justiﬁed in
conditions in which there was “no right to public trial, and no possibility
of using punishment for public purposes, or if punishments were made
draconian in order to prevent dissenters from publicizing their views”
(Singer 1973, 83–84).
7. Scott (2005, 1–2) deﬁnes infrapolitics as “the strategic form that the
resistance of subjects must assume under conditions of great peril.”
023.117 on September 07, 2017 01:34:23 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Volume 79 Number 4 October 2017 / 000pression and violence (of slavery, serfdom, or caste systems).
This model does not translate well to liberal-democratic so-
cieties where all citizens have equal rights and where it is
generally possible to protest publicly without fear of retalia-
tion. Of course, it would be naive to assume that democratic
states never use violence or draconian measures against those
involved in acts of peaceful civic resistance. And, in such cases,
the fear of retaliation might be sufﬁciently weighty and well-
founded to justify secrecy and anonymity. A case in point is
the use of excessive or even deadly force by police against
peaceful protesters or activists: from the murder of civil
rights workers in Neshoba County, Mississippi, in 1964 to
the Black Lives Matter movement today. Other instances
might involve the use of draconian prison sentences against
nonviolent civic law-breaking. Whistle-blowing would un-
doubtedly fall into this category, because in many instances
secrecy not only is a necessary requirement of performing
the act itself but also provides protection from the severity of
state sanction.8 The purpose of political whistle-blowing is,
ﬁrst and foremost, to inform the democratic public of state
involvement in wrongdoing or criminality. In that sense,
whistle-blowing differs from the secretive and anonymous
hacktivist cases of civic resistance that we have highlighted, but
is it not possible to invoke fear of retaliation as a moral justi-
ﬁcation for secrecy and anonymity in these cases as well? After
all, Swartz was facing 35 years in prison, while members of
Anonymous face up to 15 years in prison. But in both cases the
hacktivists had other forms of protest available to address their
concerns, forms that are both public and entail no or minor
legal sanctions (call for boycott, organized sit-ins, public
demonstrations, etc.). In this sense, they were situated very
differently from those protesters facing police brutality or
whistle-blowers facing long prison sentences. It would thus
be implausible for the hacktivists to invoke the dire conse-
quences of public law-breaking to account for their secrecy.
In conclusion, this form of covert and nameless civic
resistance cannot be justiﬁed by relying on either the liberal
tradition of thinking about civil disobedience or the fear-
of-retaliation argument. Therefore, we propose a new con-
cept—disruptive disobedience—that relies on a very different
set of arguments to justify acts of covert law-breaking. We8. This point can be illustrated by recent highly publicized cases of
whistle-blowing, such as the Panama Papers, Bradley Manning, Edward
Snowden (who revealed his identity only after he was beyond US legal
jurisdiction), and WikiLeaks, as a platform that facilitates anonymity.
However, in his study of the issue, Rahul Sagar lists ﬁve requirements for
the justiﬁcation of whistle-blowing, one of which is that it should not be
covert “because anonymity makes it difﬁcult for the public to discern
whose interests the disclosure is serving, and to take appropriate steps to
counter the possibility of manipulation” (Sagar 2013, 137).
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of how such forms of civic resistance can bemorally justiﬁed.
JUSTIFYING DISRUPTIVE DISOBEDIENCE
For the purposes of the argument, we assume a thin con-
ception of political obligation. In order for democracy to
function, citizens must accept that sometimes their preferred
option is not to be. If every citizen felt that they were under a
political obligation to accept as legitimate only the party they
voted for, policies they agreed with, or laws they supported,
democracy would become unintelligible. The challenge for
those who argue that resistance (mainly in the form of law-
breaking) is justiﬁed in liberal democracies is to show when
these “rules of the democratic game” can reasonably be sus-
pended given the threat that such suspensions pose. It is
therefore necessary for us to consider whether and why it
might ever be permissible to suspend these rules in the case
of those practicing the sort of covert resistance associated
with disruptive disobedience.
The core argument we will develop is that disruptive
disobedience is justiﬁed by the undemocratic exclusion of
citizens from equal access to a variety of basic resources (e.g.,
water or shelter), public services (e.g., education or health ser-
vices), or public spaces and institutions (e.g., public parks
or public buildings). These forms of exclusion are undemo-
cratic because adequate access to such resources, services, and
spaces are prerequisites for full citizenship. Disruptive dis-
obedience targets practices that foster or preserve these forms
of exclusion, seeking directly to undermine them. In this way,
disruptive disobedience functions as a corrective to depriva-
tions of democratic citizenship and is thereby democratically
justiﬁed.9
Both the Rawlsian model of civil disobedience and Mark-
ovits’s model of democratic disobedience are designed to ad-
dress the public’s sense of justice, and therefore, as forms of
public speech, must be public in nature. And those involved
in such acts of disobedience are required to accept the legal
consequences of law-breaking as the expression of their ac-
ceptance of the existing order’s legitimacy. Disruptive dis-
obedience does not need to meet these requirements, because
its telos is to undermine exclusionary practices by rendering
them unenforceable. Its goal is not to raise the public’s aware-
ness of an unjust law or even to warn the public about the
exclusionary practice; the goal is simply to end the practice.9. There may be other ways of justifying disruptive disobedience. For
example, some authors argue that related forms of resistance may be
justiﬁed on grounds of distributive injustice (e.g., Jenkins 2016; Shelby
2007). We focus on democratic exclusion, because we seek a speciﬁcally
democratic justiﬁcation for disruptive disobedience.
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000 / Disruptive Disobedience Derek Edyvane and Enes KulenovicCitizens ﬁght against exclusion by disrupting and making
meaningless those laws, rules, norms, or policy solutions that
foster that exclusion. Insofar as anonymity, secrecy, and the
avoidance of legal consequences allow for a more efﬁcient
level of disruption, then they are legitimate elements of this
type of civic resistance.
This helps us to see why the language of “disruption” is
pertinent. As Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward
(1979, 24) write, disruption occurs when “people cease to
conform to accustomed institutional roles; they withhold
their accustomed cooperation.” But disruption is not just a
matter of withdrawal. David Jenkins (2016, 329) suggests
that it also crucially involves “the active and intentional
interruption of current practices and structures.” Although
the context in which disruptive disobedience makes sense is
different from Scott’s description of infrapolitics, its tactics
echo his account of how individual instances of the hidden
resistance of peasants can achieve signiﬁcant political im-
pact despite their invisibility: “Their individual acts of foot-
dragging and evasion, reinforced often by a venerable pop-
ular culture of resistance, and multiplied many-thousand
fold may, in the end, make an utter shambles of the policies
dreamed up by their would-be superiors in the capital”
(Scott 1986, 8).
On our account, justiﬁed disruptive disobedience thus
constitutes a form of what Holloway Sparks terms “dissident
citizenship”—“the practices of marginalized citizens who
publicly contest prevailing arrangements of power by means
of oppositional democratic practices that augment or replace
institutionalized channels of democratic opposition when
those channels are inadequate or unavailable” (Sparks 1997,
75). Due to its capacity to “change minds, challenge prac-
tices, or even reconstitute the very boundaries of the political
itself,” dissident citizenship is “essential for the continuing
revitalization of democratic life” (Sparks 1997, 75). In her
discussion, Sparks focuses mainly on legal and overt forms of
dissidence—“marches, protests, and picket lines; sit-ins,
slow-downs, and cleanups; speeches, strikes, and street the-
ater” (Sparks 1997, 75)—and the democratic need for their
protection. She also notes that civil disobedience can constitute
a form of dissident citizenship. We go a step further, then, in
our suggestion that covert disruption—nonpublic contesta-
tion of arrangements of power—may also constitute a form
of dissident citizenship.
In this section, we will elaborate and defend our core
argument by answering a fundamental objection to it that
we term the argument from citizenship. The argument from
citizenship states that democratic citizenship furnishes a
package of rights that grant individual citizens access to
procedural justice: an ability to express a sense of injusticeThis content downloaded from 129.011.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms through institutional channels (including the right to vote
and the right to stand for ofﬁce) or institutionally recog-
nized channels (including public forms of dissident citizen-
ship such as peaceful protest, strikes, or civil disobedience).
As long as such rights are guaranteed, there should be no
need for individual citizens to resort to extra-institutional,
covert means in order to express their sense of injustice.
To address this argument, we need amore nuanced account
of citizenship. Speciﬁcally, we need to appreciate the ways in
which the access to procedural justice that democratic citi-
zenship is meant to provide can be incapacitated by the forms
of exclusion that disruptive disobedience is meant to counter.
To this end, we draw on the work of Judith Shklar in order to
illuminate and deepen the notion of the marginalization of
citizens that motivates Sparks’s category of dissident citizen-
ship. In her study of American citizenship, Shklar argues that,
to understand the meaning and signiﬁcance of citizenship,
“one has to listen to those . . . who have been deprived of it”
(Shklar 1991, 3).10 For Shklar, that means understanding citi-
zenship against the background of black slavery. By thinking
of it in this way, Shklar suggests that we reveal the centrality
of what she calls “citizenship-as-standing.” It is in the idea of
“standing,” as distinct from “status,” that the central import of
Shklar’s argument emerges: “Citizenship in America has never
been just a matter of agency and empowerment, but also of
social standing as well. I shun the word status because it has
acquired a pejorative meaning. I shall speak of the standing of
citizens instead” (Shklar 1991, 2). Shklar argues that “voting”
and “earning” are “the two great emblems of public standing”
in America (1991, 3) and that this is precisely because slaves
were prevented from voting or earning. No slave was a citi-
zen: “The importance of what I call citizenship as standing
emerges out of this basic fact of our political history. The
value of citizenship was derived primarily from its denial
to slaves, to some white men, and to all women” (Shklar
1991, 16).
The idea of citizenship as standing is subtle and is not
easily captured by standard categories. There is a central
contrast in studies of citizenship between the juridical con-
ception of citizenship (citizenship as legal status) and the
republican conception of citizenship (citizenship as active
participation). The former emphasizes rights, the latter re-
sponsibilities (Kymlicka and Norman 1994). But Shklar’s
account is reducible to neither. Citizenship as standing is023.117 on September 07, 2017 01:34:23 AM
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litical exclusion: slavery. Those who have been denied citizen-
ship in this way are not typically interested in it as a means to
“civic participation as a deeply involving activity” (Shklar 1991,
3), but nor are they interested simply in the formal, legal status,
or badge of citizenship. Status and standing are not the same
thing.11 This sense of the limitations of the juridical-republican
dichotomy leads Jean Cohen to suggest that Shklar’s concep-
tion represents a distinct third model of citizenship—mem-
bership. Cohen writes that we may think of “citizenship as a
form of membership in an exclusive category” (Cohen 1999,
248). And, of Shklar, Cohen writes that she “understood well
the status dimension of the membership/identity component
of the citizenship principle. In her analysis, citizenship confers
social standing—higher social status—on those allowed into
the exclusive circle vis-à-vis those outside” (Cohen 1999,
250). But this cannot be quite right either. It seems inaccurate
to equate membership with standing in this way, for, in or-
dinary usage at least, we distinguish between thosewho are just
members and those who are “members in good standing.”
Usually the mere fact of membership is thought insufﬁcient
to confer standing.
Iris Marion Young’s discussion of the forms of demo-
cratic exclusion is instructive here. Young distinguishes be-
tween what she terms external exclusion and internal ex-
clusion. The externally excluded are those who are simply
deprived of membership, those left outside of the exclusive
circle of deliberators (Young 2002, 53–54). But Young notes
that there are other forms of exclusion that occur “even when
individuals and groups are nominally included in the dis-
cussion and decision-making process” (Young 2002, 53).
Such internal exclusions “concern ways that people lack ef-
fective opportunity to inﬂuence the thinking of others even
when they have access to fora and procedures of decision-
making” (Young 2002, 55). For example, Young highlights
the way in which civility norms of “articulateness,” “dispas-
sionateness,” and “orderliness” in democratic debate serve to
privilege “speciﬁc styles of expression” and thereby function to
marginalize those who struggle to express themselves in the
approved manner (Young 2002, 53, 56). Mere “membership”
is not always enough to secure real standing.
Citizenship as standing certainly entails formal legal
status—the right to vote, the right to earn—but it is critical11. In making this claim, we contradict Benjamin Barber, who iden-
tiﬁes Shklar’s account with the juridical model and concludes that the
“missing term in Shklar’s analysis is power” (Barber 1993, 150–51). We
suggest that Barber’s interpretation is untenable in view of Shklar’s wider
body of work, which persistently reminded the reader of the fact that “the
weak and the powerful” are “the basic units of political life” (Shklar 1989,
27).
This content downloaded from 129.011.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms that the legal status can be enacted. As Shklar writes, it was
“a matter of being there, being heard, counting, having a
sense of ‘somebodyness’ as a black voter was to say many years
later” (Shklar 1991, 43). It is this sense of “somebodyness” that
is central to citizenship as standing. But we know only too well
that the formal, legal status of citizenship is no guarantee of
being a social and political “somebody.” For example, Shklar
notes the array of political impediments, both internal and
external exclusions, introduced post-Reconstruction so as ut-
terly to neuter the black “vote” in the American South: “The
vote could not protect the black Southerner against grotesque
registration requirements, literacy tests, poll taxes, grandfather
clauses, white primaries, and more chicanery than they could
possibly defeat” (Shklar 1991, 55). Formost black Southerners,
the status of citizenship and the “right to vote” could not ac-
tually be enacted. The granting of a formal legal status had not
in fact enabled them to express any sense of injustice they may
have harbored. And so it would be a mistake to suppose that
the mere “badge” of citizenship conferred in such cases any
real form of standing.
And even when legal and political impediments are re-
moved, there can remain considerable social barriers to
standing. For example, Danielle Allen discusses the case of
Elizabeth Eckford, a black American citizen, who on Sep-
tember 4, 1957, sought to exercise her legal right to attend
Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas. But Eckford
was “kept from entering the school by a mob of her fellow
citizens who called out for her lynching” (Allen 2004, 3). As
Allen explains: “For decades, white Southern citizens had
been accustomed to maintaining key public spaces as their
exclusive possession; for the sake of preserving life and
stability black Southern citizens had been accustomed to
acquiescing to such norms and to the acts of violence that
enforced them. Each set of customs, exclusionary on the
one hand and on the other acquiescent, constituted the
practical rules of democratic citizenship for a set of citizens;
together the two sets of rules . . . secured stable (though un-
democratic) public spaces” (Allen 2004, 4–5). This is a
paradigm case of the way in which legal status and formal
membership in the polity can fail to deliver real standing.
Simply to equate status with standing or membership with
standing would be to ignore the myriad of ways in which
seemingly insigniﬁcant habits of everyday life—looks, ges-
tures, modes of address and comportment—can funda-
mentally shape the contours of citizenship by denigrating
sections of society and by establishing and ingraining pat-
terns of norms that function in more or less subtle ways to
undermine genuine public standing.
Central to the idea of standing, then, is the notion of
inclusion, though not merely formal legal inclusion. To023.117 on September 07, 2017 01:34:23 AM
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13. As Linda Zerrilli has written: “In its historical deployment the charge
of incivility was a way of masking and managing disruptive demands to in-
clusion in the public realm” (2014, 116).
14. There are implications here for the idea of political obligation. Think
in particular of the way in which “fair play” theories suggest that obligations
are incurred by all participants in amutually beneﬁcial scheme of cooperation
(e.g., Rawls 1999b). We have suggested a distinction that is often overlooked
between formal participants—those bearing the status of participant, or
member, or citizen—and substantive participants—those bearing the stand-
ing of participant, member, or citizen. It is not clear that mere participant
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exercise one’s legal citizenship rights. And, conversely, then,
to be deprived of standing is to be excluded—not legally, but
socially and politically, and thus unable fully to exercise one’s
rights and, importantly, unable fully to express one’s sense of
injustice. In this way, Shklar’s distinctive account of citi-
zenship as standing helps us to see that deprivation of access
to procedural justice is not just about the stiﬂing of repub-
lican civic ambition or about the direct exclusion of indi-
viduals and groups from the formal settings of political de-
liberation. It occurs also and more fundamentally at the level
of what Shklar elsewhere terms the “democracy of everyday
life” (1984, 136), and it is bound up in the capacity of citizens
to participate in the ordinary habits, routines, and practices
of day-to-day living.12 This alerts us to the fact that depri-
vations of standing are a matter not just of the “gagging”
of nominally recognized parties to political debates but also
of the exclusion of citizens from the multiplicity of pre-
requisites for meaningful access to procedural justice. Through-
out the history of liberal democracy, many citizens have found
themselves politically “voiceless,” deprived of adequate access
to the basic decencies of procedural justice. And this is not
because they have been denied the basic rights of citizenship;
they possess those rights, but they have not been able to ex-
ercise them fully because of the way in which the social and
political structure of society has practically (if not legally) ex-
cluded them.
We argue that disruptive disobedience is the recourse of
those who possess the status of citizenship but who are
nevertheless unable fully to exercise that status because they
lack public standing—the socially and politically excluded.
With the idea of standing in place, we are thus in a position
to answer the argument from citizenship. To be a citizen
without standing is to be denied adequate access to both the
institutionally recognized channels of the political process
and the variety of forms of public protest highlighted by
Sparks—it is to have either limited or no recognized means
of expressing one’s sense of injustice. So it will not do to say
to those citizens deprived of standing that they can chal-
lenge exclusionary practices through institutional channels
or public protest. As victims of exclusion, their access to
institutional channels and public protest is substantially
curtailed. As Piven and Cloward (1979, 23) argue, “Op-
portunities for deﬁance are structured by features of institu-
tional life. Simply put, people cannot defy institutions to
which they have no access and to which they make no con-12. See Forrester (2011) for further discussion of the importance of
the “ordinary” in Shklar’s political thought, and see Rosenblum (2016) for
an extensive elaboration of Shklar’s idea of the democracy of everyday life.
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highlight injustice publicly. How could they, when no one is
listening?
The point here is not to suggest that citizens without
standing are physically prevented from protesting publicly
or from voicing their concerns. Most (though not all) cit-
izens of any minimally functioning liberal democracy are
able, for instance, to stand on a street and wave a placard.
The point is that, for those without standing, such conduct
is liable to be read not as “political protest” but rather as
“deviance” or “anti-social behavior” and to be disregarded or
even punished. Similarly, those without standing might have
physical access to public debates and decision-making pro-
cesses, but their contributions are liable to be marginalized
and suppressed, dismissed as “uncivil” or otherwise irrele-
vant.13 This sort of procedural injustice marks a potentially
grave democratic deﬁcit, and it is this failure of the democratic
system that ultimately justiﬁes the suspension of the rules of
the democratic game in cases of disruptive disobedience. The
argument from citizenship presupposes that all democratic
citizens are necessarily in a position to exercise their citizen-
ship rights and thereby to press their claims via recognized
institutional channels. We have attempted to unsettle that pre-
supposition and thus to show that acts of covert law-breaking
can be vindicated when they target practices leading to the
internal exclusion of citizens.14
In making this case for disruptive disobedience, we have
focused on some of the more extreme cases of political ex-
clusion by thinking, with Shklar and others, about the pre-
dicament of freed slaves in the American South and of the
predicament of African American citizens more generally in
the pre–Civil Rights Era. Obviously, the political exclusion of
citizens in contemporary liberal democracies is likely to pale
in comparison. Next, we return to the contemporary context
to consider whether and how the model of disruptive dis-
obedience might apply in such conditions.status should be considered sufﬁcient to ground obligations deriving from the
principle of fair play. Indeed, insofar as the social scheme operates to exclude
members from standing, then we may start to think that the obligation of
citizens is not to sustain that scheme, but in Jenkins’s (2016) expression ac-
tively to “deny reciprocity” by covertly disrupting exclusionary practices.
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allows private companies to proﬁt from scientiﬁc publications, and not
against a speciﬁc company. In this article, we go beyond Raz’s requirement of
justiﬁable civic resistance by siding with Kimberley Brownlee’s argument that
targeting private companies can be understood as an act of civic resistance if
it focuses on challenging a wider legal system (Brownlee 2007, 2012).
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The aim of this section is to consider the extent to which
the justiﬁcatory strategy we have articulated is applicable
to the case of Aaron Swartz. The point of so doing is to pro-
vide a broader sense of how the model of disruptive disobe-
dience applies to the forms of covert resistance and hacktiv-
ism that have become prominent in recent years. To achieve
this, we will contrast the case of Swartz with that of Anony-
mous 16. By discussing Swartz’s case, we also seek to address a
range of possible objections to our account. To be clear, it is
not our aim here to vindicate Swartz. However, the relevance
of our argument clearly does depend on its being applicable to
at least some contemporary cases of covert and anonymous
disobedience.
In the previous section, we argued that justiﬁed disruptive
disobedience seeks to undermine exclusionary practices that
function to drive a wedge between the status and standing of
citizens by frustrating equal access to essential resources,
public services, and public spaces and institutions. It is our
contention that Aaron Swartz’s illegal download of JSTOR
databases may be interpreted as an attempt to disrupt one
such exclusionary practice. Swartz’s argument was that de-
nying citizens access to “scientiﬁc and cultural heritage”
accumulatedmainly through publicly funded projects amounts
to the “private theft of public culture.” Declaring that “in-
formation is power” and that sharing information is “amoral
imperative,” his “Guerilla Open Access Manifesto” presents
a call to action: “We need to take information, wherever it is
stored, make our copies and share them with the world. We
need to take stuff that’s out of copyright and add it to the
archive. We need to buy secret databases and put them on
the Web. We need to download scientiﬁc journals and up-
load them to ﬁle sharing networks. We need to ﬁght for
Guerilla Open Access” (Swartz 2008).
Although in the same document he invokes the “great
tradition of civil disobedience,” the tactics he advocates are
very different from the tactics used by those who were part
of that great tradition. He calls upon those, like himself,
who already have access to these pay-wall-protected data-
bases to share their passwords and download articles for
others and also for hackers to break into the databases and
share their content online with everyone. The point is to
disrupt the practice of charging for scientiﬁc and cultural
content by private companies by making that content
available online for free.15 The goal is to make copyrighting15. Should acts of law-breaking in a democracy be directed solely against
the government, as Joseph Raz suggests (1979), or can private companies also
be legitimate targets? Again, Swartz’s case is useful here as his hacktivism was,
ﬁrst and foremost, directed against a legal framework—copyright law—that
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what Swartz was attempting to do by illegally downloading
4.8 million articles from JSTOR.16 His action was a prereq-
uisite for the massive collective action of disruption through
free sharing of these articles. Swartz envisioned a movement
whereby the covert actions of many thousands of individuals
downloading and sharing information would render the pre-
vailing system of closed access and paywalls untenable. Both
secrecy and anonymity (at least in the initial phase) were
necessary for this disruptive strategy to work.
It is illuminating here to contrast Swartz’s hacktivism with
that of Anonymous 16. In addition to the difference we have
already noted between the public character of the Anonymous
attacks and the covert character of Swartz’s breach of the
JSTOR database, there is a further important difference in the
goals pursued by either party. Swartz intended to disrupt
the process of copyrighting scientiﬁc knowledge and thereby
to transform that knowledge from marketable private good to
common good available to all. In this way, he was promoting
the equal inclusion of citizens. Anonymous, on the other hand,
used theDDoS attacks as amode of retaliation against a private
company that decided to deny service to an online whistle-
blowing platform. Their aim was to punish PayPal by dis-
rupting their services, not to disrupt an exclusionary practice.
There is also a difference between the two cases regarding the
necessity of anonymity. For Swartz’s disruption to work, both
the initial illegal downloading of articles from JSTOR and
subsequent sharing of those articles online by thousands of
users had to be performed covertly. In contrast, the DDoS
attack by Anonymous, which they themselves described as a
“virtual sit-in” disrupting PayPal’s business for a few hours,
could easily have been achieved in a nonanonymous manner.
It would have been potentiallymore effective, and certainly less
morally ambiguous, to punish PayPal’s denial of services to
WikiLeaks by staging a real public sit-in at the company’s
headquarters or by calling for a boycott of its services. A covert
cyber-attack was simply unnecessary. In both cases, themotive
of law-breakers was to address what they perceived as an in-
justice, but only in Swartz’s case is it possible to characterize16. Although we assume, given the call for action in the “Guerilla
Open Access Manifesto,” that Swartz’s intent was to share the downloaded
ﬁles, his defense team thought it more prudent to argue in court that
Swartz had no intention of sharing the articles downloaded from JSTOR.
See Brian Knappenberger’s documentary Internet’s Own Boy: The Story of
Aaron Swartz (2014).
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Swartz’s conduct may be justiﬁed as a form of disruptive dis-
obedience, while the conduct of the Anonymous group may
not.17
However, there are three important objections to the
justiﬁcation of Swartz’s actions in the terms of our argument.
In answering these objections, we appeal in each case to
resources latent within the tradition of thought and histor-
ical practice of civic resistance to frame our response. The
ﬁrst objection is that Swartz’s actions were in fact deeply
undemocratic. In the previous section, we argued that dis-
ruptive disobedience is a justiﬁed corrective to democratic
exclusion. The objection here contends that deprivation of
access to scientiﬁc research is not a form of democratic ex-
clusion. Thus, it might be argued that the political campaign
Swartz envisioned in the “Guerilla Open Access Manifesto”
is not obviously a campaign directed at addressing a dem-
ocratic deﬁcit. It is rather a call to bypass the democratic
process and simply to impose Swartz’s (controversial) in-
terpretation of justice in the distribution of knowledge. On
this view, Swartz was not practicing democratic activism, but
rather a more radical form of revolutionary activism (by im-
posing his will) in amanner that was actually anti-democratic.
Our contention has been that the deprivation of access to
“public culture” that Swartz sought to correct is a source of
democratic exclusion. But this is admittedly a controversial
claim that depends on a thick interpretation of the conditions
of democratic inclusion. Some forms of social and political
practice are patently exclusionary—think, for example, of the
poll taxes and literacy and property tests introduced in the
wake of Reconstruction and cited by Shklar. It was the direct
aim of those measures to disenfranchise black voters. By con-
trast, it is much less obvious that the control and restriction of
access to scientiﬁc knowledge that Swartz sought to disrupt
was similarly exclusionary.
It is true that Swartz’s act of disobedience relies on a thick
and somewhat controversial understanding of what citizen-
ship entails, but the same can be said of most cases of civic
resistance throughout history. The whole point of nonrev-
olutionary law-breaking is to provoke and challenge existing
power relations embedded in unjust law or policy by in-
voking a shared sense of justice (in the Rawlsian model) or
by trying to transform or expand that sense of justice (in
Singer’s model). This is especially true in cases of internal17. This contrast does not entail that what the Anonymous group did
is unjustiﬁable, only that the theoretical model developed here is not
applicable to them. For defense of DDoS attacks as acts of civil disobe-
dience, see Sauter (2014). For a broader defense of virtual nonviolent
dissent, see Calabrese (2004).
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citizens but are denied equal standing by lacking access to
certain resources or services that they should have on equal
terms with all other citizens. As we noted in the previous
section, it is part of the point of disruptive disobedience that
it seeks to enlarge the democratic sphere by challenging the
perceived boundaries of the political.
Consider such diverse historical examples as breaking the
law to end the practice of segregated schools, or to oppose
discrimination against women in the army or in the work-
place, or to challenge the policies of nuclear armament, free
trade agreements, military interventions, or state surveil-
lance. All of these cases rest on similarly thick and contro-
versial understandings of the requirements of citizenship
to Swartz’s demand for equal access to knowledge. In that
sense, disruptive disobedience does not differ from other
forms of civic resistance—civil disobedience, conscientious
objection, testing the law, whistle-blowing, or democratic
disobedience. All of these forms of resistance—by their very
nature of questioning the status quo—are controversial and
often rely on thick understandings of citizenship and de-
mocracy. If some of these forms of resistance are accepted as
uncontroversial or less controversial today, it is because the
democratic public is willing to accept them as legitimate po-
litical acts aimed at protecting the basic principles of liberal-
democratic political community. Of course, this does not
entail that all forms or instances of civic resistance are even-
tually accepted as uncontroversial, legitimate, and morally
justiﬁed by default. Ultimately, it is the democratic public that
accepts or refuses to accept law-breaking as justiﬁed and
instrumental to the promotion of democracy and principles
of equal citizenship. The same logic applies to Swartz’s case:
disruption through hacktivism and illegal sharing of scien-
tiﬁc articles can only be perceived as justiﬁed if citizens
perceive the existing copyright laws and the private owner-
ship of the results of publicly funded scientiﬁc research as
exclusionary and detrimental to their standing.18 The same
can be said of disruptive disobedience in general. The level
of success that this form of disobedience will have in dis-
rupting certain practices will, in no small part, depend on the
degree of the public’s acceptance of such disruption being
morally justiﬁed. The fact that disruptive disobedience en-
tails anonymous and covert law-breaking does not mean
that such acts are ultimately excused from public judgment.
In that sense, disruptive disobedience, as an attempt to cor-18. The public outrage and support for Swartz that followed his in-
dictment (leading to both MIT and JSTOR pulling out of the case) sug-
gests that his actions, although illegal, were perceived as justiﬁed by many.
Some of the outrage, it is worth noting, was probably caused by the
draconian sentence Swartz was facing.
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standing, is in line with the demands of equal democratic
citizenship.
The second objection grants that the deprivation of ac-
cess to scientiﬁc research is indeed a form of democratic
exclusion, but it notes that Swartz himself was not subject
to that exclusion. Swartz enjoyed full access to the JSTOR
database, and so, while some might have been justiﬁed in
covertly disrupting the exclusionary practice, Swartz was
not. The concern here is that disruptive disobedience can
only be justiﬁed in the case of disobedients who are them-
selves direct victims of exclusion. But this objection fails to
take into account the role that has been played historically by
dissenters who have not themselves been victims. Starting
with Thoreau, white abolitionists and white students on
Freedom buses all the way through to VietnamWar protests
and anti-globalization protests, the history of civic resistance
is replete with citizens who were ready to break the law they
deemed unjust on behalf of the victims, even when the law or
policy in question did not affect or disadvantage them di-
rectly. The same logic of resistance by proxy can be applied
in Swartz’s case. Moreover, one could argue that there are
two levels of exclusion being addressed here. On the ﬁrst
level, many citizens (although not Swartz himself ) are ex-
cluded from accessing scientiﬁc knowledge attained mainly
through public funding. On the second level, the majority of
citizens (including Swartz) are excluded from having a mean-
ingful and relevant impact on the decision-making process
when it comes to deﬁning copyright laws and practices. This
type of internal exclusion was diagnosed as a form of demo-
cratic deﬁcit by Markovits in his theory of democratic dis-
obedience when he talks about the ability of “special interests”
to “capture and subvert the democratic process” by remov-
ing certain issues “from democratic deliberation” (Markovits
2005, 1922–23). The fact that so much published scientiﬁc
research funded by taxpayers is owned by private companies
and accessible only to paying customers does suggest “ma-
nipulation and abuse by special interests” on this issue (Mark-
ovits 2005, 1922). Markovits suggests one way of addressing
this deﬁcit—by the use of public disobedience to raise aware-
ness of the problem. The alternative, advocated by the “Gue-
rilla Open Access Manifesto,” is to disrupt the exclusionary
practice itself through anonymous collective action.
This leads us to a third and ﬁnal objection. This objection
grants that deprivation of access to scientiﬁc knowledge
constitutes a form of democratic exclusion, and it grants fur-
ther that Swartz was entitled to resist both levels of exclusion
we have mentioned. However, it contends that Swartz’s re-
sistance could not justiﬁably take the form of covert disrup-
tion, because he had access to recognized institutional chan-This content downloaded from 129.011.
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Swartz is vulnerable to the argument from citizenship—as a
relatively privileged white man, Swartz was not deprived of
standing and could have used other democratically recognized
means of challenging the exclusionary practice. This objection
raises the question of whether disruptive disobedience can be
justiﬁed only as a last resort after all other options have been
exhausted. It is obvious that Swartz had and used the oppor-
tunity publicly to condemn the practice of charging for sci-
entiﬁc and cultural content by private companies as unjust. In
the “Guerilla Open Access Manifesto,” he even refers to the
Open Access Movement as an activist organization involved
in a public campaign to put an end to that practice. The fact
that normal democratic channels were open to him was amply
demonstrated by his involvement, subsequent to the JSTOR
affair, as a ﬁgurehead of the successful and law-abiding cam-
paign against the Stop On-line Piracy Act (SOPA). Given that
Swartz and his supporters enjoyed all the beneﬁts that the
democratic system offers for addressing unjust laws and prac-
tices—campaigning, voting, lobbying, petitions, public dem-
onstrations and even civil disobedience—why was it neces-
sary to break the law anonymously and covertly? How can
disruptive disobedience ever be justiﬁable in a democratic con-
text where citizens have other, public, ways of addressing their
diminished standing? An obvious answer would be that it is
justiﬁable only in those cases where exclusion is so complete
that dissenters are entirely denied any access to basic proce-
dural justice, any access, that is to say, to public means of
addressing their exclusion or the exclusion of their fellow
citizens. On this view, disruptive disobedience becomes the
only way of making oneself heard.
This was arguably the situation of the newly emancipated
slaves in the American South considered in the previous sec-
tion. Any disruptive disobedience on their part would have
been clearly justiﬁed inasmuch as it presented the only means
available to them of making their voices heard. But in the
context of a functioning democratic order, it is very hard to
envisage a deprivation of standing so radical that its victims
should ﬁnd themselves with literally no alternative to covert
law-breaking. If disruptive disobedience is justiﬁed only when
there is literally no other way of addressing exclusion or
only after all other options have been exhausted, there will be
very limited room, if any, for such resistance in a democratic
society.
To extend these limits we need, again, to turn to the his-
tory of civic resistance. To insist that disruptive disobedience
is justiﬁed only as a response to total exclusion from basic
procedural justice ignores the fact that no other form of civic
resistance has been expected to meet such a stringent thresh-
old. Even in more dramatic cases, like the Civil Rights Move-023.117 on September 07, 2017 01:34:23 AM
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000 / Disruptive Disobedience Derek Edyvane and Enes Kulenovicment, activists were not entirely denied basic procedural jus-
tice, as legal and law-abiding political campaigns that ran
parallel to the campaign of civil disobedience attest. The same
line of argument is applicable to the last-resort requirement.
Martin Luther King famously refers to the “distinguished jurist
of yesteryear” as a source of the principle that “justice too long
delayed is justice denied” (King 1991, 69). King was addressing
the criticism of white clergymen that the campaign of law-
breaking was unnecessary while opportunities for legal protest
remained available.What King and subsequent generations of
protesters recognized is that, within a democratic society
where there is almost always another option (the next election,
a new public campaign, the next court ruling, more lobbying,
etc.), the condition of last-resort becomes a trump card
against any justiﬁable form of law-breaking. The same
reasoning applies to disruptive disobedience: there is no reason
why anonymous disruption of exclusionary practices can be
justiﬁed only as a last resort after all legal or public options
have been exhausted. As we argued in the previous section,
possession of the formal right to protest publicly is no guar-
antee of meaningful access to democratic opposition. It is the
impotence of legal protests in changing unjust laws and
practices that justiﬁes illegal public protest. And it is the im-
potence of public protest in undermining exclusionary prac-
tices that justiﬁes covert disruption. Used as a last resort or
not, it is the purpose for which disruption is used—to
challenge democratic exclusion—that justiﬁes the act.CONCLUSION
Social, political, and technological changes in the ﬁrst decades
of the twenty-ﬁrst century have made it necessary for scholars
and activists to revisit and reconsider elements of the tradition
of civic resistance. In this article, we have attempted to con-
tribute to that enterprise by examining a particular class of
cases that do not ﬁt easily within the traditional conceptual
and normative framework of civil disobedience. Anonymous,
secretive, and covert law-breaking of the kind practiced by
Aaron Swartz is inadequately captured by the standard model
of civil disobedience, and yet intuitively many consider it a
democratically legitimate form of resistance. By articulating a
distinctive mode of dissident democratic citizenship, which
we have termed disruptive disobedience, we have tried to iden-
tify a plausible democratic justiﬁcation for Swartz’s conduct.
Unlike civil disobedience, the primary aim of which is to
arouse public awareness of injustice, the primary aim of
disruptive disobedience is directly to frustrate practices that
function to exclude citizens from basic resources, public
services, and public spaces. Such practices are often difﬁcult
to identify and address due to the misleading conﬂation ofThis content downloaded from 129.011.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms the status and standing of democratic citizens. Some forms
of exclusion are blatant in their character and effects, but
often exclusion takes a subtler form, especially where it has
become ingrained in the ordinary social and political struc-
tures of everyday life. The disruption of these kinds of struc-
tural exclusions is democratically justiﬁed because it corrects a
democratic deﬁcit, but publicity is not essential to its success
and may even prove a hindrance. Hence, responsible disrup-
tive disobedients will, where circumstances dictate, employ
covert means of disruption to achieve their democratic ends
and so realize a form of citizenship worthy of the name.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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